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1. Introduction and Background 
Phillips (1958) explored the relationship between the change in wages and aggregate 
unemployment, and found that the rate of change in the nominal wage was inversely related 
to aggregate unemployment. More recently, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) have taken a 
micro-econometric approach and argued that it is the wage level which is directly related to 
regional unemployment. There is a large body of empirical evidence across a number of 
countries suggesting that the relationship between the level of market wages and the local 
unemployment rate is negative and relatively stable, which is commonly known as the ‘wage 
curve’. The focus of the empirical literature to date has been on individuals in employment. 
In contrast, we analyse the relationship between local labour market competition and the 
reservation wages of the unemployed, the lowest wage at which an individual is willing to 
work. For those out of work, we would expect the threshold-wage to induce individuals back 
into employment to be influenced by local labour market conditions.  
2. Methodology 
Letting 𝑖 denote the individual (=1,..N), 𝑗 the local authority district (LAD) (=1,…,J), 𝑡 time 
(=1,…,T), the natural logarithm of the reservation wage 𝑟𝑤 can be modelled against a set of 
covariates 𝑿 and the natural logarithm of the local unemployment rate, 𝑈𝑗𝑡, as follows: 
log(𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜋log(𝑈𝑗𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1) 
This is the typical ‘wage curve’ specification, see Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), and is 
adopted by Blien et al. (2012) who model the German ‘reservation wage curve’. The 
estimation is usually based on either panel data, hence incorporating an individual fixed 
effect 𝜃𝑖, or on repeated (pooled) cross sections, so  𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃. The key parameter of interest 𝜋 
reflects the unemployment elasticity of the reservation wage. With respect to the market wage 
curve, where the dependent variable is employee wages, the estimate of 𝜋 is consistently 
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found to be negative at approximately -0.1 across different time periods and countries 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005).  
The recent literature has, however, acknowledged shortcomings of the above 
specification. In particular, the key covariate of interest – unemployment – is observed at a 
higher level of aggregation than the dependent variable. Hence, the parameter estimate ?̂? will 
suffer from aggregation bias. Moreover it may be important to adjust wages for individual 
composition effects. Consequently, following Bell et al. (2002) we estimate the reservation 
wage curve in two steps. The first stage models reservation wages using a panel fixed effects 
estimator to control for unobservable time invariant characteristics 𝜃𝑖: 
log(𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (2) 
The model also includes LAD dummies, 𝜃𝑗𝑡 , which can be interpreted as the average 
reservation wage in the local labour market, corrected for composition effects. In the second 
stage, reservation wage curves are estimated using the composition corrected reservation 
wage as the dependent variable: 
𝜃𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝜃𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜋1log(𝑈𝑗𝑡) + 𝜋2log(𝑈𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑗𝑡     (3) 
To account for reservation wage inertia, the model is dynamic and includes LAD and time 
fixed effects, denoted by 𝛼𝑗 and 𝜆𝑡 , respectively. The key covariate of interest is the natural 
logarithm of unemployment, denoted by 𝑈𝑗𝑡 which is also included as a lag to allow for 
possible delays in reservation wages responding to competition in the local labour market.  
3. Data 
We use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a survey conducted by the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research comprising approximately 10,000 annual individual 
interviews, from 1991 to 2008. In the BHPS, if the respondent ‘is not currently working but 
has looked for work or has not looked for work in last four weeks but would like a job’, 
he/she is asked: ‘What is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider accepting for a 
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job?’ Individuals are then asked: ‘About how many hours in a week would you expect to have 
to work for that pay?’ From this information we construct hourly reservation wages. We 
focus on an unbalanced panel NT=12,147 observations over the period 1992 to 2008 which 
consists of 5,721 individuals.
1
 Around 58% are typically classified as ‘economically 
inactive’. We include these individuals in the sample if they report a reservation wage since 
they are arguably signalling labour market attachment (see Blackaby et al., 2007). Figure 1 
shows the distribution of the natural logarithm of the hourly reservation wage, which is 1.39 
(£4.42), on average, over the period. 
Following the existing literature, control variables in 𝑿𝑖𝑗𝑡 include: a quadratic term in 
the number of years of current labour market state; the natural logarithm of pay in 
previous/last job; the natural logarithm of household labour income; the natural logarithm of 
benefit income received by the individual; an index of job search intensity based on the 
number of different types of search undertaken; aged 16 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 
and 55 plus (the omitted category); highest educational qualification distinguishing between 
degree, teaching or nursing qualification, Advanced (A) level, General Certificate of 
Secondary Education (GCSE), CSE grades 2-5, any other qualification and no educational 
attainment (the omitted category); whether currently married or cohabiting; the number of 
dependent children in the household; whether currently unemployed rather than 
‘economically inactive’; and binary indicators controlling for the occupation in which a job is 
sought. In terms of local job market competition, we use log unemployment defined at the 
LAD level. There are 278 consistent LADs in the BHPS and we match in gender specific 
unemployment rates for each LAD over time from the Labour Force Survey.  
  
                                                          
1
 The first year of the BHPS is not used because unemployment data by gender is unavailable at the LAD level. 
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3. Results 
The results are shown in Tables 1 (first stage regression) and 2 (the second stage regression). 
Individual unobserved fixed effects are clearly important in Table 1 given their statistical 
significance and all of the LAD fixed effects are also statistically significant. The reservation 
wage is decreasing in the length of the spell of unemployment, consistent with Brown and 
Taylor (2013) and Krueger and Mueller (2014). The reservation wage is increasing in the pay 
received in the previous/last job and the level of benefit income received, consistent with 
previous findings for the UK, e.g. Jones (1989), although both effects are inelastic. Job search 
is negatively associated with the reservation wage which suggests that individuals who are 
more informed about the labour market may moderate their wage expectations.  
The results of estimating equation (3), the composition adjusted hourly reservation 
wage, are shown in Table 2, where four specifications are presented: (1) a static model; (2) a 
static model incorporating lagged unemployment thereby allowing for a possible delay in 
reservation wages responding to competition in the local labour market; (3) a dynamic model 
without lagged unemployment; (4) the full specification of equation (3) incorporating 
dynamics and allowing the reservation wage to be influenced by both contemporaneous and 
lagged labour market conditions. In each specification, LAD fixed effects are statistically 
significant as are time specific effects albeit only in the static specifications. Across each 
specification, the effects of unemployment at the LAD level are statistically significant and 
negatively associated with the composition adjusted hourly reservation wage with an 
elasticity of -0.03 in the static model. Including a lag in local area unemployment suggests 
that, contrary to recent estimates of the wage curve for employees, e.g. Longhi (2012), 
reservation wage adjustment is contemporaneous.  
The final two columns of Table 2 allow for inertia in the reservation wage by 
incorporating a lagged dependent variable. In both of the dynamic specifications, the effect of 
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the lag composition adjusted reservation wage is positive and statistically significant, as is 
commonly found in modelling the wage curve for employees, e.g. Baltagi et al. (2009), but is 
relatively small in comparison with a coefficient of approximately 0.1.
2
 Whether the lag of 
unemployment is included has little effect on the elasticity of the reservation wage with 
respect to current local area unemployment where the elasticity is around -0.05. This 
elasticity is of a similar magnitude to that reported by Blien et al. (2012) for the German 
reservation wage curve. The corresponding elasticity for the employee wage curve has 
typically been found to be around -0.1, e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), but more 
recent estimates based upon the two-step approach where composition adjusted wages are 
constructed have suggested an elasticity of around -0.03 in both Germany and the UK, see 
Baltagi et al. (2009) and Longhi (2012), respectively. Hence, our results suggest that the 
reservation wage is more sensitive to local labour market conditions in comparison to that of 
the market wage curve estimates typically found for employed individuals.  
5. Conclusions 
In contrast to the existing literature, we have explored how the reservation wage reacts to 
local level unemployment rates at a highly disaggregated regional level providing evidence of 
the existence of a UK ‘reservation wage curve.’  
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FIGURE 1: Distribution of the log hourly reservation wage 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
P
e
rc
e
n
t
0 1 2 3 4
log hourly reservation wage
TABLE 1: First stage estimation results full sample; dependent variable log(𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
 COEFFICIENTS T STATISTIC 
Intercept 2.5649 (3.75) 
Duration of current labour market state -0.0064 (2.01) 
Duration of current labour market state squared 0.0002 (1.79) 
Log pay previous job 0.0052 (2.40) 
Log household labour income 0.0006 (0.30) 
Log benefit income 0.0068 (2.23) 
Index of job search intensity -0.0101 (2.61) 
Whether unemployed -0.0287 (2.05) 
Aged 16-24 0.0748 (1.10) 
Aged 25-34 0.0989 (1.73) 
Aged 35-44 0.0776 (1.66) 
Aged 45-54 0.0355 (1.06) 
Whether married or cohabiting 0.0237 (1.01) 
Number of dependent children -0.0074 (0.82) 
Degree 0.1983 (2.56) 
Teaching or nursing 0.0752 (1.77) 
A level 0.0946 (1.87) 
GCSE/ O level 0.0499 (1.05) 
CSE 0.0293 (0.39) 
Other qualification -0.0211 (0.25) 
R squared 0.5248 
H0: Individual FE 𝜃𝑖 = 0; F[5720, 3851]; p value 2.19;  p=[0.000] 
H0: LAD FE 𝜃𝑗𝑡 = 0; F[2492, 3851]; p value 1.52;  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS (NT) 12,147 
Note: Other controls include binary indicators for occupation of job sought. 
TABLE 2: Second stage estimation results full sample; dependent variable composition adjusted reservation wage 𝜃𝑗𝑡  
 1 2 3 4 
 STATIC MODEL STATIC MODEL AND 
LAGGED UE 
DYNAMIC MODEL DYNAMIC MODEL AND 
LAGGED UE 
 COEF T STAT COEF T STAT COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
𝜃𝑗𝑡−1 – – 0.0966 (3.28) 0.0958 (3.25) 
log(𝑈𝑗𝑡) -0.0306 (2.35) -0.0487 (2.24) -0.0501 (2.34) -0.0463 (2.24) 
log(𝑈𝑗𝑡−1) – -0.0275 (1.22) – -0.0259 (1.15) 
R squared 0.8817 0.9194 0.9199 0.9199 
AIC (BIC) 3,031 (5,878) 1,541 (3,919) 1,530 (3,913) 1,529 (3,907) 
H0: 𝛼𝑗 = 0; F statistic; p value 20.00;  p=[0.000] 20.97;  p=[0.000] 5.45;  p=[0.000] 5.46;  p=[0.000] 
H0: 𝜆𝑡 = 0; F statistic; p value 1.97;  p=[0.011] 1.90;  p=0[0.016] 1.55;  p=[0.080] 1.47;  p=[0.107] 
OBSERVATIONS (JT) 2,492 1,934 1,934 1,934 
Note: AIC and BIC refer to the Akaike and Schwarz Bayesian information criteria respectively.
 
